Governing Communities by Auction by Bell, Abraham & Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
Winter 2014 
Governing Communities by Auction 
Abraham Bell 
University of San Diego School of Law 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, 
Community Psychology Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, Property Law and Real Estate 
Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "Governing Communities by Auction" (2014). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1297. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1297 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2431528 
 
 
1 
The University of Chicago 
Law Review 
 
Volume 81 Winter 2014 Number 1 
© 2014 by The University of Chicago 
SYMPOSIUM 
Governing Communities by Auction 
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Auction theory has developed as a branch of game theory in 
the economic literature.1 Through the development of sophisti-
cated auctioning mechanisms, auction theorists have been able 
to come up with ways to allocate goods and services to their 
highest-value users. Well-designed auctions accomplish this 
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 1 See Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Inter-
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result by decoupling a bidder’s bid from the price she will pay if 
she wins. Auctions based on decoupled bids have a unique abil-
ity to reveal private information and overcome information 
asymmetries.2 Furthermore, they have the potential to do so at a 
lower cost than conventional market transactions. 
In this Article, we seek to harness the insights of auction 
theory to devise an improved governance model for common-
interest communities, perhaps the most important real-property 
form today. 
The rise of the common-interest community has trans-
formed the landscape of residential property in the United 
States. In 1970, only 2.1 million Americans lived in common-
interest communities—condominiums, cooperatives, and various 
other mixtures of common and private ownership in a single real 
estate development.3 Today, that number exceeds 60 million.4 
Common-interest communities have become the favorite proper-
ty form of developers. In California, for example, 60 percent of 
all new residential construction in the 1990s fell into this cate-
gory.5 This trend is unlikely to change in the future.6 
A salient feature of common-interest communities is their 
dependence on collective-choice mechanisms to manage the af-
fairs of the members and plan future development. The most 
common mechanism used for this purpose is voting.7 Voting, 
while eminently democratic, can also lead to choices that do not 
fully represent the interests of constituents. The preferences col-
lectively expressed through voting can be unstable,8 manipulated 
 
 2 The most famous example may be a Vickrey auction. See William Vickrey, Coun-
terspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J Fin 8, 20–23 (1961). 
 3 Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Commu-
nities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 Urban Law 335, 335 (2005); Founda-
tion for Community Association Research, Statistical Review 2012: For US Homeowners’ 
Associations, Condominium Communities, and Housing Cooperatives, National and 
State Data (2012), online at http://www.cairf.org/foundationstatsbrochure.pdf (visited 
Mar 2, 2014).  
 4 Foundation for Community Association Research, Statistical Review at *5 (cited 
in note 3). 
 5 Tracy M. Gordon, Planned Developments in California: Private Communities and 
Public Life 3 (Public Policy Institute of California 2004). 
 6 See Karen Christensen, Book Review, 10 Berkeley Planning J 126, 127 (1995). 
Christensen points out that common-interest communities serve the economic interest of 
all relevant stakeholders, including homeowners, developers, local governments, and 
planners. Id. 
 7 For detailed discussion, see Part I. 
 8 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2–3 (Cowles 2d ed 
1963); Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Social Choice in a Representative 
Democracy, 88 Am Polit Sci Rev 185, 186–87 (1994). 
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by chairpersons who strategically dictate the order of votes,9 and 
subject to majority oppression of minority interests.10 Up-or-
down voting is also insensitive to the intensity of preferences, so 
that a wave of indifference can overcome the intensely desired 
wishes of a small number.11 Proposals may be strategically craft-
ed in order to allow some to free ride on the preferences of oth-
ers.12 Collective decision making, when delegated to representa-
tives, can also fall prey to the well-known agency problem: 
representatives may prefer their own interests to those of their 
constituents.13 
In this Article, we suggest that well-designed auctions can 
provide common-interest communities with a better decision-
making mechanism. An auction’s main advantage over voting 
lies in its ability to reflect the intensity of participants’ prefer-
ences. At the same time, auctions avoid many of the strategic 
manipulations and much of the minority oppression to which 
votes are prey. Although auctions come with their own imperfec-
tions, in many cases they outperform voting. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the 
rise of common-interest communities and detail their common 
governing mechanisms. Part II turns to the extant literature on 
collective decision making, with a focus on auction theory. Part 
III combines the lessons of the first two parts and advances a 
new governance mechanism for common-interest communities. 
Part IV explores variations on the mechanism and addresses po-
tential flaws. 
 
 9 See, for example, William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U 
Cin L Rev 385, 420–21 (1990) (“By ordering the choices available to the board, the 
chairman can assure that his individually preferred choice is selected from among mutu-
ally exclusive outcomes.”). 
 10 Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 BU 
L Rev 273, 319–30 (1997) (“As we have seen, despite its apparent advantages, majority 
rule risks undervaluing minority interests. By outvoting the minority, the majority 
avoids confronting and evaluating minority concerns.”). 
 11 See, for example, Francesco Parisi, The Market for Votes: Coasian Bargaining in 
an Arrovian Setting, 6 Geo Mason L Rev 745, 748 (1998) (“The inability of the democratic 
process to capture the intensity of the voters’ preferences is a by-product of the generally 
espoused principle that every individual is entitled to oneand only onevote.”). 
 12 See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 
70 S Cal L Rev 741, 750–53 (1997). 
 13 See, for example, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 
308 (1976). 
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I.  DECISION MAKING IN COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
In this Part, we briefly describe the history and develop-
ment of common-interest communities, before turning to their 
governing structures. 
A. The Development of Common-Interest Communities 
Modern homeowners’ associations and condominium associ-
ations, the “two basic types of residential community associa-
tions,”14 came relatively late to the United States.15 In the era be-
fore condominiums, homeowners sometimes gathered together 
for common governance in private street associations,16 co-ops,17 
and suburban homeowners’ associations.18 Only in the 1960s 
were condominiums finally recognized as legitimate forms of 
property ownership.19 By the 1970s, cooperatives, condomini-
ums, and suburban-style attached houses “had become popular 
nationally and comprised the major share of new owner-occupied 
housing.”20 Since that time, the share of common-interest hous-
ing among all newly constructed, owner-occupied homes has 
fluctuated, ranging from a low of 7 percent to a high of 37 per-
cent.21 Numerically, the number of cooperatives and condomini-
ums increased from around 400 thousand in 1970 to nearly 1.7 
million by the start of 1975.22 Condominiums so gained in popu-
larity during this time “that some experts declared the rental 
apartment obsolete.”23 
 
 14 Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 
John Marshall L Rev 303, 319–20 (1998). 
 15 See Patrick J. Rohan, Drafting Condominium Instruments: Provisions for De-
struction, Obsolescence and Eminent Domain, 65 Colum L Rev 593, 593 (1965). 
 16 Marc A. Weiss and John W. Watts, Community Builders and Community Associ-
ations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private Residential Governance, in Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ed, Residential Community Associations: 
Private Governments in the Intergovernmental System? 95, 98 (1989). 
 17 Matthew Gordon Lasner, No Lawn to Mow: Co-ops, Condominiums, and the Rev-
olution in Collective Homeownership in Metropolitan America, 1881–1973 *36 (un-
published PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2007), online at http://gradworks.umi.com 
/3265184.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 18 Weiss and Watts, Community Builders and Community Associations at 98–99 
(cited in note 16). 
 19 See Randy K. Lippert, Governing Condominiums and Renters with Legal 
Knowledge Flows and External Institutions, 34 L & Pol 263, 264 (2012). 
 20 Lasner, No Lawn to Mow at *212 (cited in note 17). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id at *521. 
 23 Id. 
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Most recently, the number of residents in common-interest 
communities in the United States increased from 2.1 million in 
1970 to 62 million in 2010, an increase of 2,852 percent,24 while 
at the same time the population of the United States increased 
from 205 million to approximately 310 million, an increase of on-
ly 51 percent.25 There are no signs yet of any slackening in com-
mon-interest communities’ popularity. 
B. Governing Mechanisms in Common-Interest Communities 
Governing mechanisms in common-interest communities 
can roughly be grouped into three main types: homeowners’ as-
sociations, condominium associations, and cooperative organiza-
tions. All three prototypes involve a mix of property-law and 
corporate-law doctrines. 
In homeowners’ and condominium associations, each owner 
owns a separate unit, and owners are bound together legally 
primarily by servitudes.26 Servitudes are bilateral agreements 
enforceable under property law.27 For servitudes to govern effec-
tively, each of the many owners has to be bound to the same set 
of servitudes, which can then be enforced by any owner against 
another owner. In homeowners’ and condominium associations, 
the servitudes are generally aggregated in a large document 
called the covenants, conditions, and regulations (CCR).28 Unfor-
tunately, servitudes cannot provide a full legal framework for 
 
 24 Foundation for Community Association Research, Statistical Review at *5 (cited 
in note 3). 
 25 US Census Bureau, Population: 1900 to 2002, online at http://www.census.gov 
/statab/hist/HS-01.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014); US Census Bureau, US and World Popula-
tion Clock, online at http://www.census.gov/popclock (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 26 Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U Ill L Rev 829, 830: 
These private developments, which go by a variety of names in the literature, 
are remarkably diverse. They can be either gated or ungated, can comprise an-
ything from a single condominium building to a large neighborhood of single-
family homes, and may be targeted at consumers in a variety of income strata. 
However, all such developments are organized around the same principle: the 
use of servitudes to privately control land use. 
See also 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.2 (2000) (“A ‘common-interest 
community’ is a real-estate development or neighborhood in which individually owned 
lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be 
avoided by nonuse or withdrawal.”). 
 27 1 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.1 (2000) (“A servitude is a legal 
device that creates a right or an obligation that runs with land or an interest in land.”). 
 28 See David C. Drewes, Note, Putting the “Community” Back in Common Interest 
Communities: A Proposal for Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 Colum L 
Rev 314, 316 (2001). 
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governing common-interest communities. After the CCR is 
agreed upon, new issues may come along, requiring new collec-
tive action. Thus, the CCR generally creates a continuing gov-
ernance mechanism that forces unit owners to follow new deci-
sions made by an agreed-upon institution. 
The governance mechanism for ongoing decision making in 
condominiums is the condominium association, which is general-
ly comprised of all owners,29 with membership mandatory and a 
condition of ownership.30 However, the association is a separate 
legal entity with “the power to govern the community and to 
provide for the care, upkeep, and physical maintenance of the 
common elements.”31 The association, in turn, typically delegates 
this power to a board.32 The board “is responsible for making all 
the business decisions that affect the association. It has fiduci-
ary responsibility, legal oversight, and overall management re-
sponsibility for all of the association’s business.”33 
The constitutive document of a condominium is called a dec-
laration, or master deed.34 If we analogize a condominium to a 
state, the declaration is its constitution.35 The declaration is of-
ten very difficult to amend.36 The Uniform Condominium Act 
recommends that residential condominiums require at least 67 
percent of the votes of the association to amend the declara-
tion.37 
The bylaws constitute the next most important document 
governing a condominium. The bylaws are the rulebook by 
which the association and the board function.38 Bylaws provide a 
specific infrastructure under which the condominium will be 
governed.39 The bylaws are more specific than the declaration in 
that they “spell out the policies and procedures that will be 
 
 29 Donna S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in the United States: A Select-
ed Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources, 103 L Library J 249, 272 (2011). 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Bennett, 103 L Library J at 273 (cited in note 29) (emphasis and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 34 Id at 267. 
 35 Id. For further discussion of the analogy between common-interest communities 
and states, see Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Sur-
vey, 43 U Chi L Rev 253, 254–56 (1976).  
 36 Bennett, 103 L Library J at 268 (cited in note 29). 
 37 Uniform Condominium Act § 2-117 (National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws 1980). 
 38 Bennett, 103 L Library J at 268 (cited in note 29). 
 39 Id. 
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employed in the everyday governance and administration of the 
complex.”40 
At its most basic level, a condominium is governed by its 
rules and regulations. The rules of a condominium state the 
rules of behavior of the condominium and, like the declaration 
and bylaws, are binding on each owner.41 Usually, rules take ef-
fect upon a vote of the board, without unit owner agreement, as 
long as owners receive a copy of the rules adopted.42 
Homeowners’ associations are also governed by their own 
bylaws, rules, and regulations.43 They vary from condominium 
associations only in large-scale planned developments and 
planned-unit developments. Such developments may have sev-
eral homeowners’ associations operating under an umbrella as-
sociation, or master association, that “maintains the property 
and facilities common to the entire development, and often nego-
tiates the provision of services for the smaller associations rep-
resenting each part of the development.”44 The smaller associa-
tions, often representing owners by geographic area or land use, 
will then “oversee whatever structures or properties are common 
to their own section.”45 
Co-ops go a step further than both homeowners’ and condo-
minium associations. Owners do not even own the units in 
which they reside; they own only shares in the cooperative, 
which owns all the realty. Thus, cooperative organizations need 
not use servitudes. Property law typically comes into play 
among fellow owners only insofar as the law of leaseholds is rel-
evant. The founding documents of the cooperative and the leases 
dictate some outcomes, but ongoing decisions regarding the 
community are generally made by the management of the coop-
erative (generally a board comprised of some of the leasehold-
er/co-op owners). Corporate law therefore plays a dominant role 
in arranging the owners’ mutual rights.46 
In contrast to homeowners’ and condominium associations, 
cooperatives operate largely as corporations that are incorporated 
 
 40 Patrick E. Kehoe, Cooperatives and Condominiums 19 (Oceana 1974). 
 41 Bennett, 103 L Library J at 268 (cited in note 29). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Weiss and Watts, Community Builders and Community Associations at 102 
(cited in note 16). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual’s Interest in a Cooperative 
Apartment: Realty or Personalty?, 73 Colum L Rev 250, 253 (1973). 
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in their native state.47 The first cooperatives elected a board of 
directors, who had responsibility for the maintenance and daily 
governance of the cooperative.48 This practice has survived into 
modernity, although now boards largely delegate their mainte-
nance roles to professional management companies that are re-
sponsible for issues such as hiring and supervising staff, keeping 
books, paying property taxes, and approving all sales and sub-
leases.49 One of the more important duties of the board, one for 
which there is usually no counterpart in condominium associa-
tions, is to evict and rent out a shareholder’s unit if she fails to 
pay maintenance charges attributed to her.50 
Actual decision-making processes in homeowners’ associa-
tions, condominium associations, and cooperatives are all actual-
ly quite similar, despite their drastic differences of legal form. 
Decisions in the condominium association are generally 
made by majority vote, in which the actual number of votes al-
lotted to each owner generally depends on value of the unit (of-
ten determined by the size of the unit).51 In addition, each asso-
ciation member has the right to participate in the election of the 
board.52 As with association votes, the number of votes each 
owner gets in electing the board varies by community.53 
The actual voting in the association for members of the 
board of a common-interest community usually occurs in one of 
two ways: traditional voting or cumulative voting. Under a tra-
ditional-voting (or single-winner) system, candidates run for a 
particular seat on the board. Each seat is voted upon separately 
by the association members, who vote their entire allotment of 
votes for a certain candidate, and the top vote getters for each 
seat are elected to the board. Under this method, a coalition of 
50 percent plus one vote could theoretically control the entire 
 
 47 See Lasner, No Lawn to Mow at *56–57 (cited in note 17). 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id at *94. 
 50 Id at *204. 
 51 See, for example, Uniform Condominium Act § 2-107, comment 1 (National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1980). 
 52 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, RCA Characteristics and 
Issues, in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ed, Residential Com-
munity Associations 9, 10 (cited in note 16) (“Board members are chosen from among the 
unit owners, and votes are apportioned on the basis of ownership.”). 
 53 See Uniform Condominium Act § 2-107, comment 1 (National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1980). 
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board indefinitely. A minority of owners under this voting sys-
tem may be systematically excluded from board membership.54 
Cumulative voting tends to give minorities a much greater 
voice in decision making.55 Under a cumulative-voting (or mul-
tiwinner) system, the members of the board are not elected to a 
particular seat. Instead, “[e]ach shareholder is entitled to multi-
ply the number of shares owned by the number of directors to be 
elected and cast the product for one or more candidates,”56 and 
the candidates with the most votes are elected to the board. 
Cumulative voting thus “permit[s] minority shareholders to con-
centrate their votes to secure representation on a board.”57 The 
policy underlying cumulative voting is to empower “minority 
[owners] to elect [board members] protective of their interests.”58 
This method of voting is still relatively rare.59 For example, un-
der the Uniform Condominium Act, cumulative voting can be 
used for only the purposes of electing members of the executive 
board, and then only if it is allowed for in a condominium’s by-
laws.60 Similarly, for cooperatives, cumulative voting is often al-
lowed only if it is provided for in the certificate of incorporation, 
a cooperative’s most basic constitutive document.61 
Cumulative voting generally plays no role in the daily gov-
ernance of common-interest communities. Boards typically make 
decisions by a simple majority or plurality vote of the board.62 
Even when a common-interest community’s bylaws require a 
vote of the entire association for a purpose other than electing 
board members, often all that is required is a plurality, majority, 
or supermajority of votes.63 
 
 54 For an example from corporate law, see Sanjai Bhagat and James A. Brickley, 
Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J L & Econ 339, 
339 (1984). 
 55 See id at 339–40. 
 56 Richard Siegler and Eva Talel, Cooperatives and Condominiums: Cumulative 
Voting Revisited, 233 NY L J *1 (May 4, 2005). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Jay Romano, When the Minority Rules the Majority, NY Times J10 (July 17, 
2005) (noting that only about 10 to 15 percent of the cooperatives and condominiums in 
New York City employ cumulative voting). 
 60 Uniform Condominium Act § 2-107(c) (National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws 1980). 
 61 See Siegler and Talel, Cooperatives and Condominiums, 233 NY L J at *1 (cited 
in note 56). 
 62 Community Associations Institute, M-100: The Essentials of Community Associa-
tion Management 77–79 (2011). 
 63 Id at 83. 
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C. The Problem with Common-Interest Community 
Governance 
There have been numerous complaints concerning the ways 
in which boards exercise their power.64 Evan McKenzie objects to 
the means by which the boards take and maintain authority. He 
notes that “[s]ometimes the boards simply vote themselves into 
perpetual power, since they can prevent opponents from voting 
or running for election by suggesting that the upstarts are not in 
good standing with the [homeowners’ association]. . . . These 
elections can make Broward County look like the epitome of fair 
voting.”65 
Common-interest communities necessarily regulate sensi-
tive aspects of residents’ lives, and as the number of residents of 
common-interest communities has grown, so too have conflicts 
over the creation and application of community rules. The gov-
erning mechanisms in common-interest communities must ren-
der decisions on a vast array of subjects, running the gamut 
from home businesses, pets, and lawn ornamentations, to own-
ers’ leasing agreements, pool hours, and garbage pickup. These 
decisions often leave owners displeased with the outcomes. 
One study reported that over two-thirds of the common-
interest communities in New York City had experienced litiga-
tion over a three-year span.66 The Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty: Servitudes also acknowledges, “the quantity of litigation 
arising out of homeowner challenges to association actions in re-
cent years may be regarded as excessive.”67 Conflicts in common-
interest communities can be “emotionally charged” and “often 
evoke . . . extreme hostility, bitterness and frustration.”68 Dis-
putes between owners and association boards or among owners 
 
 64 See generally Carol Lloyd, The Myth of Privatopia: Do Private Residential Gov-
ernments Mean the End of the American Dream?, SF Gate (Dec 17, 2002), online at 
http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/article/The-Myth-of-Privatopia-Do-private-residential 
-2710581.php (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 65 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Jay Romano, Your Home: Reducing Legal Costs in a Co-op, NY Times R5 (Aug 
18, 1996). 
 67 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13, comment b. 
 68 See Scott E. Mollen, Alternate Dispute Resolution of Condominium and Coopera-
tive Conflicts, 73 St John’s L Rev 75, 75 (1999) (“The printable vocabulary of occupancy 
conflicts often includes words like ‘livid,’ ‘vicious,’ ‘revenge,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘arrogant,’ ‘pompous,’ 
‘power crazy,’ ‘breach of fiduciary duty,’ ‘self-dealing,’ ‘favoritism,’ ‘insensitive,’ ‘litigious,’ 
‘stupid,’ and ‘troublemaker.’ Not only are occupancy conflicts extremely intense, but they 
are propagating with alarming rapidity.”). 
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are legion and frequently make it to court.69 Unfortunately for 
dissatisfied owners, courts generally give great deference to the 
decisions of common-interest-community boards.70 
The residents’ dissatisfaction results from two endemic 
problems that currently plague collective decision making in 
common-interest communities. First, the community does not 
make collective decisions itself. Rather, it delegates decision 
making to a small number of representatives, typically the 
board members. This, of course, gives rise to an agency problem. 
The second problem is that voting does not necessarily yield 
results that reflect the community’s true preferences. Indeed, as 
Professor Kenneth Arrow famously showed in his “impossibility 
theorem,” given certain conditions, voting cannot possibly lead 
to a decision that truly expresses collective preferences.71 Even if 
the conditions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem are not met, the 
outcome of votes can be manipulated by chairpersons and are 
susceptible to majority oppression.72 
Additionally, since up-or-down voting ignores intensity of 
preferences, it may lead to a net aggregate unhappiness when a 
minority intensely disapproves of a certain proposition while the 
majority only mildly supports it.73 
At this point, one can argue that the use of supermajorities 
can solve this problem. A supermajority requirement increases 
the probability that the outcomes of votes represent the aggre-
gate will of the community and lowers the risk of majority op-
pression. Unfortunately, supermajorities can only ameliorate 
these problems, not solve them. The introduction of a superma-
jority requirement cannot ensure that the outcomes of votes are 
welfare maximizing in cases in which there are small minorities 
with very intense preferences. 
But the real problem with supermajority requirements is 
much more acute. Supermajority rules give small groups block-
ing power. This small minority may use this blocking power to 
withhold its assent until granted a side payment. Holdouts may 
foil efficient projects or create costly and inefficient payment of 
bribes. Certain voters may oppose an efficient project strictly out 
 
 69 See id at 79–82. 
 70 See Drewes, Note, 101 Colum L Rev at 327–28 (cited in note 28). 
 71 Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values at 98 (cited in note 8). 
 72 See Sterk, 77 BU L Rev at 319 (cited in note 10). 
 73 Parisi, 6 Geo Mason L Rev at 748 (cited in note 11). 
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of the hope to extract payment from the majority in exchange for 
not blocking the proposal. 
Interestingly, there have been a handful of studies on voting 
mechanisms in common-interest communities that have exam-
ined the role of developers in making the best of the poor tools 
available to them. Professors Yoram Barzel and Tim Sass, for 
example, argued optimistically that developers of common-
interest communities tend to choose voting mechanisms that re-
duce the power of majorities to exploit minorities.74 Developers 
do this by linking voting power to assessments, homogenizing 
units sold, and selectively requiring supermajority voting. Pro-
fessors Danny Ben-Shahar and Eyal Sulganik cast doubt on this 
optimistic assessment, noting that a variety of factors, including 
variant ex ante estimations of the likelihood of future disagree-
ments, may lead to very different voting rules.75 At the end of 
the day, though, both the optimistic and the pessimistic views 
acknowledge that any voting rules will leave collective decision 
making subject to the usual flaws of voting. 
Given the well-known flaws of decision making in common-
interest communities, the time has come to contemplate a better 
alternative that is based on the insights of auction theory. 
II.  AUCTIONS AND COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING 
Auctions are a specialized way of getting many people to 
opine together on a subject, while expressing the intensity of 
their preferences. Auctions can be used not merely to allocate 
goods; they may also be used, more generally, to determine 
which goods or decisions should be produced. They may also be 
used to determine future courses of action or leaders. 
Essentially, auctions are “stylized markets with well-
defined rules,”76 and as such can provide a vehicle for introduc-
ing some of the benefits of markets without the drawbacks. Un-
like votes, auctions reflect the intensity of the participants’ pref-
erences. In auctions, participants indicate numerically the value 
they attach to the bid and thereby reveal the intensity of their 
 
 74 See Yoram Barzel and Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q 
J Econ 745, 760 (1990). 
 75 Danny Ben-Shahar and Eyal Sulganik, Can Co-owners Agree to Disagree? A The-
oretical Examination of Voting Rules in Co-ownerships, 31 J Real Est Fin & Econ 207, 
221 (2005). 
 76 Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 385 
(Blackwell 4th ed 2007). 
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preferences for a certain outcome. It is possible to think of voting 
as a specialized auction in which participants are permitted to 
bid only two values: zero or one (that is, a ballot against or in fa-
vor of the proposal). Mild and strong preferences alike can be 
expressed only in bids of one. Mild and strong dislike can be ex-
pressed only as zero. Ordinary auctions allow bidders to go be-
yond one and zero and instead bid any number. 
Of particular relevance to our project is the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism, which resulted from the work of Pro-
fessor William Vickrey in the 1960s and the follow-up work of 
Professors Edward Clarke and Theodore Groves in the 1970s. 
Vickrey is credited with having pioneered the use of game 
theory to analyze auctions.77 He pointed out that in first-price 
auctions with sealed bids (in which the highest bidder wins the 
auction and pays her actual bid), participants would not bid 
their true reserve values; rather, they would bid based on their 
estimates of others’ evaluations of the auctioned item. First-
price, sealed-bid auctions, in other words, are elaborate games 
in which each participant attempts to out-guess the other partic-
ipant’s bidding strategy. Because first-price, sealed-bid auctions 
induce bidders to act strategically based on their estimates of 
others’ suspected bids, such auctions may result in a misalloca-
tion of the auctioned good in those cases in which the highest-
value bidder underestimated the bids of her peers. 
Vickrey proceeded to propose a superior method: the second-
price, sealed-bid auction, under which the good is allocated to 
the highest bidder at the second-highest price.78 In the second-
price, sealed-bid auction—known as a “Vickrey auction”79—the 
highest bidder wins the auction but pays the second-highest bid. 
Here, a bidder’s best strategy is to bid her true valuation be-
cause the price she might eventually pay does not depend on her 
bid; the bid determines only who wins the auction.80 Thus, a 
 
 77 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Introduction, in Richard Arnott, et al, eds, Public Eco-
nomics: Selected Papers by William Vickrey 13, 14 (Cambridge 1994) (“In ‘Counterspecu-
lation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,’ he starts the game theory of auctions 
when individual valuations are private information.”). 
 78 See Vickrey, 16 J Fin at 8 (cited in note 2). 
 79 Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J Econ Surveys 
227, 229 (1999). 
 80 Michael H. Rothkopf, Thomas J. Teisberg, and Edward P. Kahn, Why Are Vickrey 
Auctions Rare?, 98 J Polit Econ 94, 95 (1990) (“Because they are dominant strategies, 
they do not require the gathering or analysis of any information about the situation or 
intentions of competitors.”). 
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Vickrey auction eliminates the incentive to bid strategically and 
induces truthful bidding.81 
Importantly, Vickrey’s insight extended far beyond the nar-
row context of allocating existing goods to bidders. Vickrey’s con-
tribution made it possible to use auctions as a generalized 
mechanism for getting people to reveal private information and 
expose individual preferences. In this capacity, auctions came to 
represent an important instrument of social choice by providing 
policy makers with information about the preferences of constit-
uents. 
Picking up on this aspect of Vickrey’s theory, Clarke pointed 
out the possibility of using auctions in the context of “allocation-
al decisions involving public goods.”82 Clarke observed that Vick-
rey auctions could help resolve the paradox of supplying public 
goods. On the one hand, private markets do not supply public 
goods due to high transaction costs and free riding.83 On the oth-
er hand, governments will likely make mistakes in providing 
public goods, because beneficiaries have every reason to lie 
about their preferences for the good. Particularly if beneficiaries 
are required to pay for the benefit they receive from the public 
good, they will underreport the benefit they derive from the pub-
lic good.84 Clarke suggested that this problem may be addressed 
by using a Vickrey auction to extract from beneficiaries true in-
formation about their actual preferences for the public good. He 
suggested that once the true preferences of the public are 
known, public goods should be provided only if the aggregate 
benefit derived by the public exceeds the cost of provision. As in 
Vickrey auctions, allocational decisions would be divorced from 
pricing decisions. The government should provide a public good 
based on the sum of revealed demand from bidders. However, 
bidders should pay a price based on others’ demand, rather than 
their own revealed demand.85 Clarke’s price-setting mechanism 
ensures both that bidders cannot achieve a more favorable out-
come by revealing their demand incorrectly and that the total 
amount of the contributions always equals or exceeds the total 
 
 81 Id (“[T]he equilibrium strategy is that the bidder bids his or her true cost or val-
ue.”). 
 82 Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 Pub Choice 17, 17 
(1971). 
 83 Id at 18–19. 
 84 See id at 21. 
 85 See id at 22–26. 
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supply cost.86 In other words, the mechanism guarantees that 
contributions will cover the cost of provision, and the budget will 
stay balanced. 
Subsequently, Groves made a pivotal contribution that com-
plemented the work of Vickrey and Clarke. In a pioneering arti-
cle from 1973,87 Groves turned to auction theory to tackle the 
challenge of provision of public goods. Like Vickrey and Clarke 
before him, Groves sought a demand-revealing or incentive-
compatible mechanism that would induce truthful reporting or 
bidding. However, he also wanted his mechanism to be “Pareto 
optimal.”88 The Pareto-optimality condition requires that the 
provision decision is welfare maximizing in the sense that no 
other decision could represent an improvement over it. To meet 
this criterion, Groves proposed that the winner of the auction 
pay the sum total of the cost (or inconvenience) the adoption of 
her preference imposes on others.89 
The combined result of the three theorists has become 
known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, or simply the 
VCG mechanism. 
To illustrate how the VCG mechanism may be utilized to de-
termine which public goods to provide, imagine a locality that 
debates whether to build a new stadium, a new bridge, or a new 
school. Assume for simplicity’s sake that the locality has only 
three residents—Anna, Beth, and Carol.90 Naturally, the locality 
can put the three options on a ballot and ask the members to 
vote. The voting option has two obvious drawbacks: First, it is 
possible in this case that the vote will yield a tie—with each op-
tion receiving one vote. Second, even if the vote does not result 
in a tie, a clear win for one option may not be the utility-
maximizing outcome. Why? Imagine that Anna and Beth both 
vote for the stadium and Carol for the school. It could very well 
be the case that Anna and Beth have a very slight preference 
for the stadium over the school while Carol has a very strong 
 
 86 Clarke, 11 Pub Choice at 27 (cited in note 82). 
 87 See generally Theodore Groves, Incentives in Teams, 41 Econometrica 617 (1973). 
For another important contribution, see generally Theodore Groves and John Ledyard, 
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, 45 Econo-
metrica 783 (1977). 
 88 Groves and Ledyard, 45 Econometrica at 791 (cited in note 87). 
 89 For example, A values a certain public good X at $100 and a different public good 
Y at $85, B values X at $65 and Y at $120, and both bid accordingly. Public good Y will 
be provided as it received the highest bid ($120) and B will have to pay A $15—the dif-
ference in A’s preference between public goods X and Y. Id at 791–92. 
 90 The number can be actually much larger without loss of generality. 
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preference for the school. Additionally, if the voting takes place 
in stages—for instance, the members first decide between the 
school and the bridge, and then between the winner of the first 
vote and the stadium—a strategic mayor could manipulate the 
voting sequence and predetermine the result. 
The VCG mechanism can take care of all these problems. 
Imagine that Anna, Beth, and Carol now bid instead of vote. For 
simplicity’s sake, imagine Anna and Beth have identical prefer-
ences. Under the auction system, Anna and Beth each bid $50 
on the stadium option, $10 on the bridge option, and $40 on the 
school option while Carol bids $30 on the stadium option, $0 on 
the bridge option, and $60 on the school. Tallying up the bids 
yields $130 for the stadium, $20 for the bridge option, and $140 
on the school. The result is that a new school will be built. 
The bids and totals are presented in Table 1, below. 
TABLE 1.  TRUTHFUL BIDS AND RESULTS 
 Stadium Bridge School 
Anna 50 10 40 
Beth 50 10 40 
Carol 30 0 60 
Total 130 20 140 
Result: school will be built; Carol will pay $20. 
 
In terms of the assessments charged, Anna and Beth will 
pay nothing (because the outcome would be the same if they had 
not bid), while Carol would be charged $20 (the amount of utility 
lost by Anna and Beth together as a result of Carol pushing the 
school option to the top). The classic VCG mechanism would 
therefore fund the project out of general revenues. 
The VCG-auction mechanism successfully reveals partici-
pants’ valuations because a bid that is too high risks exposing 
the bidder to excessive payments, while a bid that is too low ex-
poses the bidder to a suboptimal choice of public good. 
III.  GOVERNING COMMUNITIES BY AUCTION 
In this Part, we explain how the VCG mechanism may be 
used as an important governance tool in common-interest com-
munities. Like townships, common-interest communities face an 
identical decision to that of local governments: how to decide on 
which projects to fund with the fees they collect from residents. 
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To answer this question, common-interest communities, like 
townships, can harness the VCG mechanism. 
A. Illustrating the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism in 
Governance 
Consider, for example, the question of what management 
company should be hired by the community. Assume that a 
homeowners’ association must choose among management com-
panies X, Y, and Z. Instead of putting the matter to a simple 
vote, the association may use an auction. 
For simplicity’s sake, we will use three-member communi-
ties in all of our examples in this Section. Our three repeat play-
ers are Anna, Beth, and Carol. Assume that Anna and Beth each 
like Management Company X significantly more than Y and 
slightly more than Z. They bid $50 on Management Company X, 
$10 on Y, and $40 on Z. Carol, meanwhile, greatly prefers Z, and 
likes X a little better as well. Carol bids $30 on Management 
Company X, $20 on Y, and $60 on Z. Tallying up the bids yields 
$130 for Management Company X, $40 for Y, and $140 for Z. 
The result is that Management Company Z will be hired. 
The bids and totals are presented in Table 2, below. 
TABLE 2.  TRUTHFUL BIDS AND RESULTS 
 Management 
Company X 
Management 
Company Y 
Management 
Company Z 
Anna 50 10 40 
Beth 50 10 40 
Carol 30 20 60 
Total 130 40 140 
Result: Management Company Z will be hired; Carol will pay $20. 
 
In terms of the assessments charged, Anna and Beth will 
pay nothing (because the outcome would be the same if they had 
not bid), while Carol would be charged $20 (the amount of utility 
lost by Anna and Beth together as a result of Carol pushing 
management company Z to the top). 
B. The Conditions for Using the VCG Mechanism in 
Governance 
We have seen that the VCG mechanism can be used in gov-
ernance of common-interest communities for two very different 
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kinds of decisions. First, we have seen that the mechanism can 
be used to make basic governance decisions, such as which 
amenities to construct. Second, we have illustrated that the 
mechanism can be used to make more traditional capital-
expenditure decisions, such as which management company to 
hire. These examples are illustrative of a wide range of govern-
ance decisions that must be made by common-interest communi-
ties. However, there are other decisions that must be made that 
are less amenable to VCG mechanisms. 
In order for a VCG auction to function, there must be dis-
crete choices among which bidders can choose. An auction takes 
place, in other words, only after someone has decided on the 
choices to present to bidders, as well as such practicalities as the 
timing of the auction. 
This means that VCG auctions cannot replace entirely the 
functions of a board in common-interest communities. While the 
auction mechanism will allow the board to turn over many of the 
decisions to the ownership at large, some of the decision making 
will remain in the hands of the delegates. 
Common-interest communities that use VCG auctions will 
need to develop guidelines for allocating decision making be-
tween the board and the ownership at large. Fortunately, it is 
not difficult to imagine how this might be done. The common-
interest community can adopt a rule requiring basic decisions 
like capital expenditures, changes in assessments, and the like 
to be made by all owners through an auction mechanism. 
The VCG mechanism is not perfect: it suffers from various 
potential flaws under different conditions.91 For instance, VCG 
does not ensure a balanced budget, as the revenues produced by 
 
 91 See, for example, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, and Shigeo Matsubara, A Limi-
tation of the Generalized Vickrey Auction in Electronic Commerce: Robustness against 
False-Name Bids, in Proceedings of the Annual National Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence 86, 89 (AAAI 1999); Michael H. Rothkopf, Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical, 55 Operations Rsrch 191, 191–96 (2007); Law-
rence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction, in Peter 
Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, eds, Combinatorial Auctions 17, 22–26 
(MIT 2006); Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm, Failures of the VCG Mechanism in 
Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges, in Peter Stone and Gerhard Weiss, eds, Proceed-
ings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent 
Systems 521, 523–28 (Association for Computing Machinery 2006); Yoram Bachrach, 
Honor among Thieves: Collusion in Multi-unit Auctions, in Wiebe van der Hoek, et al, 
eds, 1 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
agent Systems 617, 623–24 (International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems 2010). 
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the auction will not necessarily correlate with the cost of the 
public goods provided.92 
More significantly, while bidding the truth is a winning 
strategy for auction participants, it is only a “weakly dominant” 
strategy, meaning that under some conditions participants will 
coalesce around a strategy of not telling the truth. When auction 
participants suffer from significant budget constraints, truth 
telling will not be the dominant strategy.93 In some cases, auc-
tion participants can manipulate the auction to lead to undesir-
able outcomes. For instance, if the identity of bidders cannot be 
easily ascertained, dishonest bidders can manipulate the out-
come by creating fictitious bidders.94 
Consequently, in many cases, one cannot achieve mathe-
matical certainty of truthful bidding in VCG auctions. Nonethe-
less, in many circumstances of common-interest-community gov-
ernance, VCG remains a potentially important tool for 
improving common decision making. 
For our purposes, the most significant flaw is that auctions 
are vulnerable to collusive bidding.95 If coordination is not too 
costly, bidders can shade up their bids, get the outcome they 
want, and walk away without paying anything. In short, when 
coordination costs are sufficiently low, VCG auctions can be easi-
ly rigged; if two or more bidders submit the same bid, none is 
considered the marginal bidder whose bid secured the winning 
outcome, and therefore none of them will have to pay anything.96 
We address this problem at greater length in the next Part. 
Collectively, the potential flaws of VCG mechanisms must 
be taken into account when deciding which common decisions 
may be taken by auction. 
IV.  ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
In this Part, we examine the potential counterarguments to 
our proposal and assess their strengths. Specifically, we discuss 
three potential objections. First, we will discuss the effect of 
 
 92 See Part IV.C. 
 93 Jean-Pierre Benoît and Vijay Krishna, Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget 
Constrained Bidders, 68 Rev Econ Stud 155, 159 (2001). 
 94 See generally Makoto Yokoo, False-Name Bids in Combinational Auctions, 7 
ACM SIGecom Exchanges 48 (2007). 
 95 Ausubel and Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction at 26 (cited in note 
91). 
 96 For detailed analysis, see Part IV.A. 
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collusive bidding on our proposal. Second, we will examine how 
various agenda-setting strategies affect our proposal. Finally, we 
address budgetary issues. 
A. Collusive Bidding 
As we noted, game theorists have observed that VCG auc-
tions are potentially susceptible to collusion among bidders.97 
To illustrate this problem, let us return to our earlier exam-
ple of a three-person community bidding on a management com-
pany. As we saw in Table 2, if the parties were to vote honestly, 
Anna and Beth would each bid $50 on Management Company X, 
$10 on Management Company Y, and $40 on Management 
Company Z, while Carol would bid $30 on Management Compa-
ny X, $20 on Management Company Y, and $60 on Management 
Company Z. The result is that in a straight VCG auction, Carol 
would get her way and Management Company Z would be hired. 
To illustrate the problem of collusion, now assume that all 
facts are the same, except for the fact that Anna and Beth decide 
to collude against Carol. They want Management Company X to 
win, but wish to avoid paying. To this end, they agree that each 
will strategically bid $100 on Management Company X and 
nothing on the other management companies. Carol, by con-
trast, continues to bid truthfully ($30 on Management Company 
X, $20 on Management Company Y, and $60 on Management 
Company Z). 
The collusive bidding yields the following totals: $230 on 
Management Company X and only $60 on Management Compa-
ny Z. In this case, Anna and Beth will get their way and Man-
agement Company X will be selected even though it does not 
represent the honest choice of the participants. The bids and re-
sults are summarized in Table 3, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97 See Part III.B. 
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TABLE 3.  COLLUSIVE BIDS AND RESULTS 
 Management 
Company X 
Management 
Company Y 
Management 
Company Z 
Anna 100 0 0 
Beth 100 0 0 
Carol 30 20 60 
Total 230 20 60 
Result: Management Company X will be hired; no one will pay. 
 
Because of the collusive bidding, no one will have to pay an-
ything. Given the bidding amounts, none of the participants 
alone can be said to have altered the outcome. Take Anna’s bid 
out of the picture and Management Company X would still pre-
vail 130–20–60. Likewise, if one eliminates Beth’s bid, Manage-
ment Company X would still prevail 130–20–60. If one erased 
Carol’s bid, the result would be even starker: 200–0–0 in favor of 
Management Company X. 
The possibility of successful collusion is not equal in all VCG 
auctions. For instance, when multiple items are being auctioned 
at the same time (such as when a VCG auction is used to dis-
tribute several broadcast licenses), the possibility of collusion is 
greater than when only one item is being auctioned.98 This 
means that VCG auctions can be structured for use in common-
interest communities to reduce the possibility of collusion, for 
instance, by having only one item bid upon at once. 
The possibility of successful collusions is also affected by 
factors external to the auction, such as the ability to police bar-
gains. It’s hardly worth it for parties to pay each other for their 
auction bids if parties to the collusion can cheat without penalty. 
If bargains for auction bids are forbidden by the governing rules 
of common-interest communities, it will be harder to enforce 
payments for collusive bids, and, consequently, collusion will be 
less attractive. 
Ultimately, the problem of collusion cannot be eliminated. It 
is worth noting, however, that there is little reason to believe 
that VCG auctions, even when tainted by collusion, will give us 
a poorer reading of collective preference than voting. Decision 
making by voting is at least equally vulnerable to collusive decision 
 
 98 Conitzer and Sandholm, Failures of the VCG Mechanism in Combinatorial Auc-
tions and Exchanges at 522 (cited in note 91). 
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making; bargains for votes are so frequent that they have 
prompted an entire colorful jargon, including terms like pairing 
and logrolling. 
The VCG mechanism, then, can still provide a better read-
ing of collective preference in most cases, and no worse a reading 
than existing mechanisms. 
B. Manipulating the Voting Agenda 
Another limitation of our mechanism is that it is susceptible 
to agenda setting. With respect to voting, the Marquis de Con-
dorcet famously demonstrated that under certain circumstanc-
es,99 if voters have only ordinal, but not cardinal preferences,100 a 
chairperson can “cycle” options to show contradictory prefer-
ences. That is to say, if voters have preferences that are fixed 
relative to other options (in other words, having ordinal utility), 
but are not measurable in any absolute scale (cardinal utility), a 
chairperson can manipulate the order of voting and relative 
preferences to demonstrate inconsistent results. 
Consider, for instance, the case in which the three voters 
Anna, Beth, and Carol have three options among which to 
choose: a stadium, a bridge, and a school. Assume that Anna 
prefers a stadium to a bridge and a bridge to a school. Beth pre-
fers a bridge to a school and a school to a stadium. Carol prefers 
a school to a stadium and a stadium to a bridge. The preferences 
are summarized in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4.  PREFERENCES BY BIDDERS 
Anna Beth Carol 
Stadium Bridge School 
Bridge School Stadium 
School Stadium Bridge 
 
If we put the options to a simple vote, there will be no clear 
winner. If the voters are asked to decide between a stadium and 
 
 99 See generally Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la 
probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Imprimerie Royale 1785). 
 100 Cardinal utility takes account of the magnitude or intensity of preferences 
whereas ordinal utility simply ranks preferences without ascribing significance to their 
intensity. See generally Bernard M.S. van Praag, Ordinal and Cardinal Utility: An Inte-
gration of the Two Dimensions of the Welfare Concept, 50 J Econometrics 69 (1991). 
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a bridge, a stadium will be chosen by a vote of 2 to 1 (Anna and 
Carol will vote for a stadium while Beth will vote for a bridge). If 
the voters are asked to choose between a bridge and a school, the 
bridge will be selected by a margin of 2 to 1 (Anna and Beth will 
vote for the bridge while Carol will vote for the school). And if 
the choice is between a school and a stadium, a school will be 
chosen by a margin of 2 to 1 (Beth and Carol will vote for the 
school while Anna will vote for the stadium). The series of paired 
votes will continuously raise one option over another. Building 
on Condorcet, Kenneth Arrow famously showed that when pref-
erences are ordinal, and other basic conditions are met, no vot-
ing system can be designed to translate the ordinal preferences 
into an aggregate choice.101 
This gives enormous power to agenda setters. Under these 
circumstances—indeed, in many real-world situations—the or-
der of the votes, or the agenda, will determine the outcome. For 
example, if the agenda setter has a preference for a stadium, she 
can decide that the first vote will be between a bridge and a 
school. In this vote, the bridge option will prevail. Then she can 
pit the stadium against the bridge, and the stadium will be se-
lected. By eliminating the school option in the first round, the 
agenda setter guarantees that a stadium option will be chosen in 
the second round, and a new stadium will be eventually built. In 
other words, the agenda setter can manipulate the ordinal utili-
ty rankings in order to ensure that her personal preference 
emerges as the winner. 
Auctions are supposed to avoid this set of problems by forc-
ing expressions of cardinal rather than ordinal utility. In auc-
tions, bidders typically express their preferences with an abso-
lute number rather than by ranking. Consequently, there can be 
no problem of cycling or any other unstable preference. 
Unfortunately, in the real world it is impossible to eliminate 
the problem of agenda setting, even if we switch from voting to 
auctions.102 First, administrators may refuse to put certain op-
tions up for bidding and thereby “mute” certain preferences of 
homeowners, forcing them, instead, to accept the administrators’ 
 
 101 See generally Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (cited in note 8). 
 102 On agenda setting, see Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public 
Choice: A Critical Introduction 39–41 (Chicago 1991). 
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preferences. By selective omissions, administrators may deprive 
homeowners of the ability to make their collective choice.103 
Relatedly, administrators can use their agenda-setting pow-
er to stagger the auction process and amplify or depress the ap-
parent popularity of options. Administrators may group several 
options together to eliminate some candidates, and then pair off 
the winner with other candidates. The VCG mechanism must re-
ly on a person, that is, an agenda setter, to decide which options 
will be subject to bidding. This gives the agenda setter the power 
to manipulate the process by putting certain options up for bid-
ding first and then, once the results are in, instituting another 
round of bids in which the winning results are pitted against 
new options. Clever agenda setting could lead to the elimination 
of popular options in early rounds, paving the way to the selec-
tion of the administrator’s preferred choice by the community. 
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the VCG mechanism 
clearly minimizes opportunities for abusive agenda setting rela-
tive to simple votes. Because the VCG mechanism can easily ac-
commodate simultaneous bidding on multiple options, it will be 
harder for agenda setters to justify forcing voters into a series of 
choices between pairs of options. Thus, the adoption of the VCG 
mechanism will allow community members to positively demand 
that their management add options to the ballot. Hence, the 
VCG mechanism represents an improvement over voting 
schemes. 
C. Budgets 
A third and final potential objection relates to budgetary is-
sues. As we noted before, VCG auctions do not “balance the 
budget.”104 The revenue raised by VCG auctions is a function of 
the gaps in utility enjoyed by different auction participants, ra-
ther than the cost of the item on which they bid. It is possible to 
hold a VCG auction in which participants pay nothing, but the 
outcome of the auction is the purchase of an expensive service. 
 
 103 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 
547–48 (1983) (discussing the flaws of voting in the legislative context). It should be not-
ed, however, that Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey have argued, based on empirical 
studies in political science, that “[w]hen agenda setters use their power to reach results 
that are systematically opposed to the preferences of the legislators, they are more likely 
to face challenges to their power.” Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 61 (cit-
ed in note 102). 
 104 See Part III.B. 
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Conversely, a VCG auction may lead to large payments by par-
ticipants for a relatively inexpensive item. 
This feature of VCG mechanisms means that common-
interest communities that are governed by VCG mechanisms 
must raise revenues in some other fashion. They cannot rely 
solely on the revenues of auctions to finance their activities. At 
the same time, such communities must make provisions for 
holding excess funds raised by VCG auctions pending their ul-
timate disbursal. 
Fortunately for our proposal, this does not represent any 
significant change from the current way in which common-
interest communities are governed. Common-interest communi-
ties must assess fees, and these fees must make up the shortfall 
for any VCG auctions. Likewise, excess revenues from VCG auc-
tions should be held by the management of the common-interest 
community in the treasury for future common expenses. 
Interestingly, the disconnectedness between the auction’s 
ability to raise revenue and its ability to indicate bidders’ de-
sires is important for the functioning of VCG auctions. VCG auc-
tions best incentivize truth telling if revenues from the auction 
do not benefit any of the auction participants. In fact, if one 
wanted to best preserve the truth-telling incentives of VCG auc-
tions, one would destroy all the revenues, in order to ensure that 
participants do not take into account potential profit from other 
auction participants in making their offers.105 Our proposed 
mechanism takes a less extreme approach, eliminating direct 
revenue to participants in the auction. A common-interest com-
munity that wanted to improve the truth-telling incentives even 
further could arrange for revenue sharing among many local 
common-interest communities, with each community taking the 
revenue from other communities’ auctions. Such variations on 
the VCG auction would have interesting effects that are beyond 
the scope of our analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have demonstrated how auction theory 
can be harnessed to design innovative governance mechanisms 
for property. Drawing on the insights of Vickrey, Clarke, and 
Groves, we have crafted a mechanism of auctioning suitable for 
making decisions in common-interest communities. We then 
 
 105 See Groves, 41 Econometrica at 628–29 (cited in note 87). 
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demonstrated that under certain conditions our mechanism out-
performs standard voting and can therefore improve collective 
decision making in common-interest communities. 
Given the pride of place of auctions in the theory of social 
choice, it is surprising that discussion of auctions as an alterna-
tive to voting is largely wanting from property scholarship and 
practice. It is high time common-interest communities consid-
ered auctions as the governance tool of choice. 
